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NONDISCRIMINATION ORDINANCE 101
SAN FRANCISCO'S NONDISCRIMINATION IN CITY
CONTRACTS AND BENEFITS ORDINANCE: A NEW
APPROACH TO WINNING DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIP BENEFITS
Todd Foremant
In our communities, at work, in government, and in the media,
lesbians and gays are more visible than ever before This increased
visibility reflects the fact that many Americans now live in families
comprised of or headed by lesbian or gay couples. 2 In spite of this reality,
homosexual couples are denied most of the legal benefits that heterosexual
couples obtain through marriage licenses.3 This Comment focuses on the
San Francisco Nondiscrimination in City Contracts and Benefits Ordinance
as a strategy for lesbians and gays to win one of the most important
benefits of marriage-spousal employment benefits. Part I describes the
experiences of employers who offer domestic partnership benefits. Part II
describes the original version of the San Francisco Nondiscrimination in
t Associate Attorney, White & Case LLP, New York, New York. B.A., with honors,
Grinnell College, 1995; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1999.
1. For an account of how lesbians and gay men are challenging the traditional notion
of family in the workplace, see Steven N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnerships Benefits:
Redefining Family in the Work Place, LoY. CONSUMER L. REP., Winter 1994, at 49.
2. See id.
3. The many benefits of marriage include immigration rights, property rights, tax
benefits, and employment benefits such as "partner insurance coverage, pension
survivorship plans, and sick and bereavement leave." Philip S. Home, Challenging Public-
and Private-Sector Benefit Schemes Which Discriminate Against Unmarried Opposite-Sex
and Same-Sex Partners, 4 LAW & SEXUALrrY 35, 48 (1994) (citation omitted). Unmarried
partners are also denied a variety of discounts including "family discounts offered by
airlines and insurance companies and credit disbursement programs offered by banks." Id.
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City Contracts Ordinance. Part II introduces legal challenges to that
original draft; including analysis of the broad policy issues involved. Part
IV reviews the decision in Air Transport Association v. City & County of
San Francisco.4 Part V compares the effectiveness of the San Francisco
Ordinance to other strategies for winning domestic partnership benefits,
and Part VI concludes with a discussion of the effectiveness of the San
Francisco strategy.
I. EXPERIENCE OF EMPLOYERS ALREADY OFFERING DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIP BENEFITS
Some people find it surprising that employers can offer domestic
partnership benefits, including health insurance, to employees at a minimal
expense. The percentage of employees taking advantage of these benefits
is likely to be low, especially if the benefits are extended only to couples
who may not legally marry (i.e. homosexual couples). According to one
survey, "only between 1 and 3 percent of employees typically opted for the
benefits, most of them heterosexual couples. Homosexual pairs are more
likely to have separate jobs and thus benefits from their own employers." 5
Further, some lesbian and gay employees may forego the benefits because
they "fear coming out openly as gay in order to take advantage of the
benefit.",
6
Concerns about lesbian and gay health issues may be another
hindrance to offering health insurance to domestic partners. Some
employers may be wary of offering the benefits in part because of concern
about "the high cost of AIDS. Many employers feel that by offering
domestic partnership benefits, a large number of gay partners with AIDS
will be added to health insurance policies." 7 However, "the incidents of
AIDS within the gay community are leveling off, whereas the number of
cases within the heterosexual population continues to increase."8  In
addition, the treatment of AIDS is comparable to, or less costly than,
treatment of many other diseases. 9 The San Francisco Human Rights
Commission also points out that "because same-sex... domestic partners
typically have fewer dependents than married couples, there are
4. 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Air Transport 1].
5. Vincent J. Schodolski, United Up in Air over Domestic Partner Push, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 10, 1997, at Bus. 1 (citing a survey conducted in 1997 by William M. Mercer Inc., a
California consulting firm).
6. Jeffrey Leib, Same-Sex Benefits Cost Little; Few Recriminations or Added Expense,
HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 10, 1997, at Bus. 1 (quoting Sue Anderson, executive director of
Equality Colorado, a lesbian and gay rights organization).




significantly lower maternity and dependent health care costs associated
with their coverage."'  Furthermore, a large number of insurance
companies offer policies designed to cover same-sex domestic partners."
Many employers already offer spousal employment benefits to
unmarried domestic partners. 12 Indeed, in some areas the benefits have
become so commonplace that employers fear losing top recruits if they do
not offer the benefits.13  Some companies mention their domestic
partnership benefits in efforts to recruit new employees. For example,
Coors Brewing Company, which began offering benefits in 1995, touts the
policy as a "good reason to come work at the Golden, Colo., brewery.' 4
Companies may also offer benefits to "keep talent in house. Especially in
the computer and entertainment industries, it comes down to the issue of
employee retention."'5 While the boycott of Disney by Southern Baptists
reveals that a small number of companies may lose money due to boycotts,
they may earn more money by garnering the loyalty of gay and lesbian
consumers 16 and by receiving the benefits of organized efforts to support
boycotted companies.17  In addition to private employers, many local
10. Leib, supra note 6, at Bus. 1 (citation omitted).
11. For a comprehensive list of insurance companies selling the coverage, see San
Francisco Human Rights Commission, Nondiscrimination in Benefits Resource Materials
(visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://www.sfhumanrights.org/Igbth/handbook.htm> [hereinafter
Resource Materials].
12. Employers offering health insurance benefits to domestic partners include Coors
Brewing Company, Shell, American Express, Barnes & Noble, Chevron, Walt Disney,
Eastman Kodak, and Microsoft. See Leib, supra note 6, at Bus. 1; see also Bettina Boxall,
A New Era Set to Begin in Benefits for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMEs, July 7, 1997, at A3 (citing
a "recent survey by the accounting firm of KPMG [which] indicates that nearly a quarter of
employers nationwide with more than 5,000 workers provide health benefits to
nontraditional partners...").
13. See, e.g., Ann Davis, "And What About Domestic Partners?", NAT'L L.J., June 5,
1995, at A6 (noting that the prominent New York law firms offering domestic partnership
benefits include Davis, Polk & Wardwell; Debevoise & Plimpton; Milbank, Tweed, Hadley
& McCloy; Paul, Weiss, Rifind, Wharton & Garrison; Shearman & Sterling; Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz; and White & Case).
14. Leib, supra note 6, at Bus. 1.
15. Id. (quoting Howard Tharsing, a San Francisco financial adviser) (citation omitted).
16. See, e.g., Rebecca Cantwell, Same-Sex Benefits at US West; Supporters Say Time Is
Right for the Change, ROCKY MouNTAIN NEws, Aug. 16, 1997, at 1B (describing how US
West hopes to appeal to gay consumers by offering domestic partnership benefits).
17. Human Rights Campaign, a gay and lesbian rights lobbying organization,
encouraged its members to "buy gift certificates for Disney toys, movies and theme parks
and donate them to children in hospitals" in response to the Southern Baptists' boycott.
Kim I. Mills, Religious Wrong, HuM. RTs. CAMPAIGN Q., Summer 1997, at 6, 6; see also
King of Grits Alters Menu to Reflect Northern Tastes, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Sept.
23, 1997, at 5C (noting that consumers express concern when Cracker Barrel restaurants
open in their communities). In 1991, "Cracker Barrel headquarters issued a memo directing
[store] managers 'not to employ those... who fail to meet normal heterosexual values."'
Id.
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governments offer health insurance to the same-sex domestic partners of
employees.18
II. THE SAN FRANCISCO NONDISCRIMINATION IN CITY CONTRACTS AND
BENEFITS ORDINANCE
In an effort to secure domestic partnership benefits for more of its
citizens, the governing body of San Francisco, California, the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors ("the City"), passed the Nondiscrimination
in City Contracts and Benefits Ordinance ("the Ordinance"). The
Ordinance was passed in November 1996 and became effective June 1,
1997.19 The Ordinance provides in part:
No contracting agency of the City, or any department thereof,
acting for or on behalf of the City and County, shall execute or
amend any contract... with any contractor that discriminates in
the provision of bereavement leave, family medical leave, health
benefits, membership or membership discounts, moving
expenses, pension and retirement benefits or travel benefits as
well as any benefits other than bereavement leave, family
medical leave, health benefits, membership or membership
discounts, moving expenses, pension and retirement benefits or
travel benefits between employees with domestic partners and
employees with spouses, and/or between the domestic partners
and spouses of such employees, where the domestic partnership
has been registered with a governmental entity pursuant to state
or local law authorizing such registration.2
In short, the Ordinance requires all contractors doing business with the
City to offer equivalent benefits to spouses of married employees and
registered domestic partners of unmarried employees.2 ' As the Ordinance
is the first of its kind in the United States,22 it is the first implementation of
a new strategy for winning domestic partner employee benefits.
As originally drafted, the Ordinance would have a substantial impact
beyond San Francisco. The law requires any company doing business with
the City to offer employee benefits to all registered domestic partners of
18. These include San Francisco, Berkeley, West Hollywood, and Santa Cruz,
California; Ann Arbor and East Lansing, Michigan; Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts;
Seattle, Washington; Minneapolis, Minnesota; New York, New York; Washington, D.C.;
and Travis County, Texas. See Hargrove, supra note 1, at 50.
19. See San Francisco, Cal., Admin. Code §§ 12B-12C (1997); Victoria Slind-Flor,
Church, Airlines Balk at Benefits Law, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1997, at A6.
20. San Francisco Human Rights Commission, San Francisco Administrative Code
Chapter 12B, (visited Oct. 21, 1998) <http://www.sfhumanrights.org/1gbth/12b.htm>.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 33-35 for exceptions to this policy.
22. See Slind-Flor, supra note 19, at A6.
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employees throughout the United States.23 Thus, under the Ordinance, a
major corporation conducting only a small fraction of its business with the
City of San Francisco must offer domestic partner benefits to all of its U.S.
employees in order to continue to do business with the City. The
Ordinance could thus lead to many employees winning benefits in locations
outside of San Francisco.
The Ordinance is also significant in that it affords tangible benefits to
domestic partnership registration. Denied the opportunity to marry,
lesbians and gays do have the opportunity to register as domestic partners
with local governments that provide for such registration.24 "The law
defines a domestic partner to be any person who has registered a domestic
partnership with a governmental body pursuant to state or local law."5 In
addition, "[t]he Human Rights Commission has developed a list of
government-sponsored domestic partner registries. 26  Though the
Ordinance only requires that companies offer the benefit to "registered"
domestic partners, "[m]any companies have developed an internal
mechanism (usually an affidavit) for identifying domestic partnerships. ' a
The San Francisco Ordinance does not require such a proactive response
from employers; "[t]o comply with the non-discrimination requirements of
the law, a contractor should only seek to verify domestic partnerships to the
same extent it seeks to verify marriages. If verification is desired,
employees could be asked to produce a copy of their marriage license or
domestic partnership certificate.' 28  Some jurisdictions also allow
23. See San Francisco Human Rights Commission, Rules of Procedure for the
Nondiscrimination in Contracts: Equal Benefits Provisions of Chapter 12B of the San
Francisco Administrative Code (visited Oct. 21, 1998)
<http://www.sfhumanrights.org/lgbth/rules.htm> [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
24. Though many domestic partner registries require that both domestic partners reside
in the jurisdiction of the registry, some do not make this requirement. See San Francisco
Human Rights Commission, Nondiscrimination in City Contracts-Domestic Partners:
Frequently Asked Questions (visited Oct. 19, 1998)
<http://www.sffiumanrights.org/lgbth/domparfaq.htm> [hereinafter Frequently Asked
Questions). Therefore, a couple may not have to reside in a jurisdiction that recognizes
domestic partners to take advantage of the San Francisco Ordinance. See id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The City provides a partial list of states, cities, and counties which offer
domestic partnership registration: Hawaii; Atlanta, Ga.; Ann Arbor, Mich.; Berkeley, Cal.;
Boston, Mass.; Brookline, Mass.; Cambridge, Mass.; Carboro, N.C.; Chapel Hill, N.C.;
Chicago, Ill.; Washington, D.C.; Davis, Cal.; Hartford, Conn.; Ithaca, N.Y.; Laguna Beach,
Cal.; Madison, Wis.; Minneapolis, Minn.; New York, N.Y.; Oakland, Cal.; Palo Alto, Cal.;
Provincetown, Mass.; Rochester, N.Y.; Sacramento, Cal.; San Francisco, Cal.; Seattle,
Wash.; and West Hollywood, Cal. See Resource Materials, supra note 11.
27. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 24; see also Leib, supra note 6, at Bus. 1
(noting that Coors Brewing Company "requires that employees who want health coverage
for same-sex partners sign an affidavit that they have lived together for at least a year").
28. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 24.
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heterosexual couples to register as domestic partners. The San Francisco
Ordinance applies to heterosexual as well as same-sex partnerships.
In order to make a bid on a contract with the City, a contractor must
submit a Substantial Compliance Authorization Form which must indicate
when nondiscriminatory benefits will be available.31  The Ordinance
permits only a three-month period for the administrative steps necessary to
implement the benefits.32
There are a few limited exceptions to the employee benefits
requirement. First, the Sole Source Exception provides that the City may
accept a bid from a company that is the "sole source available to provide
the City with the needed goods or services. ' 3 Second, the City may accept
a bid from a contractor when "the contract is necessary to respond to an
emergency which endangers the public health or safety" and "no entity that
complies with the nondiscrimination in benefits requirements of Chapter
12B capable of performing the emergency work is immediately
available."3 Finally, a company that has "taken all reasonable measures to
end discrimination in benefits" and "is unable to do so" may instead "offer
a cash equivalent to employees for whom equal benefits are not
available. 35
Il. THE CHALLENGES TO THE SAN FRANCISCO ORDINANCE
A. The Air Transport Association/United Airlines Challenge
The San Francisco Ordinance has met with some significant
opposition. The most high-profile challenge has come from United
Airlines ("United"), which was in the process of negotiating new leases
with the City at San Francisco International Airport when the City enacted
29. See id.
30. See San Francisco Human Rights Commission, Substantial Compliance
Authorization Form, HRC-12B-103, (visited Oct. 19, 1998)
<http://www.sfhumanrights.org/Igbth/substantial.htm> [hereinafter Form]. The law does
not apply to contracts made before June 1, 1997, unless they were made after January 3,
1997, and are for a period of more than two years. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 24.
31. See Form, supra note 30. "An extension of this time may be granted at the
discretion of the Director of the Human Rights Commission or the Director's designee upon
the written request of the City Contractor." Id.
32. See id.
33. Rules of Procedure, supra note 23.
34. Id.
35. San Francisco Human Rights Commission, Reasonable Measures Affidavit (visited
Oct. 19, 1998) <http://www.sfhumanrights.org/Igbth/reasonableform.htm>.
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the Ordinance.36 The airline balked at the prospect of offering domestic
partnership benefits to all of its employees as a condition of signing the
lease.37 On behalf of United and other carriers operating in San Francisco,
the Air Transport Association ("ATA"), the trade organization for the
nation's major airlines, and the Airline Industrial Relations Conference, an
industry lobby group, sued the City in federal district court in May 1997.3s
The suit was heard in October 1997,39 and the court handed down a
40decision on April 10, 1998. United, dissatisfied with the court's decision,
failed to close a deal on the leases with the City.41 In an effort to avoid
eviction from the airport, the airline again filed suit in the federal district
court in Oakland.42  However, on May 27, 1999, the court affirmed its
earlier decision, saying that United had to offer non-ERISA benefits to
some employees.43 On July 30, 1999, United changed its policy and
promised to offer a full range of same-sex domestic partnership benefits,
but the lawsuit continues and may even end in the U.S. Supreme Court.4
B. The ACLJ Challenge
In addition to the ATA and United suits, the Ordinance faces a less
publicized legal challenge. The American Center for Law and Justice
("ACLJ") filed suit in a U.S. district court on behalf of S.D. Myers, Inc.
("SDMI"), an Ohio-based electrical maintenance company. SDMI said that
if it "gave health insurance to unmarried partners of employees, [SDM1]
would be approving of a lifestyle that God has said we are not to approve
of. '45 The ACLJ likewise espouses a fundamentalist Christian perspective
and actively fights gay rights measures around the country.4 6 According to
36. See Schodolski, supra note 5, at Bus. 1. United is the largest private employer in
the San Francisco metropolitan area, with about 20,000 local employees. See id.
37. See Leib, supra note 6, at Bus. 1.
38. See id.
39. See Rachel Gordon, City Partners Law Battle Heads for U.S. District Court, S.F.
EXANINER, Oct. 9, 1997, at A15.
40. For the specifics of the decision, see infra Part IV.
41. See Gregory Lewis, United Sues over Partners Law, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 29,
1998, at Al.
42. See id.
43. See Air Trans. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, No.
C97-01763CW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8747, at *28 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1999) [hereinafter
Air Transport I1].
44. See Rachel Gordon, Focus Shifts in Domestic Partner Law, S.F. EXAmNBR, Aug. 8,
1999, at D1.
45. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, No. C97-04463, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8748, at *6, (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1999).
46. For example, the ACLJ declared on an update to its web page that it has "just
obtained a great victory in Hawaii as the State Legislature overwhelmingly approved a
constitutional amendment which would ban same-sex marriages! [The ACLJ] worked
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the ACLJ, "[imn a very real way, opening up [an] office in San Francisco is
like entering the enemy's territory. After all, it was San Francisco Mayor
Willie Brown that recently sponsored a gay and lesbian wedding ceremony
at City Hall. But after much prayer ... [it was decided to] establish[] [the]
office.' 47 On May 27, 1999, the court rendered its decision, rejecting all of
the ACLJ's arguments.48
C. Other Challenges to the Ordinance
Two nonprofit organizations also have opposed the Ordinance.
Catholic Charities at first objected to giving domestic partnership benefits
to its employees, but eventually agreed to extend the benefits following a
legal battle.49 The Salvation Army also opposed the Ordinance and pulled
out of a $3.5 million city contract to provide shelter for the homeless and
meals for senior citizens.5
The two disputes with charities were cited as the catalyst for action in
the U.S. House of Representatives to punish San Francisco for passing the
Ordinance. 51  Representative Frank Riggs (R-Cal.) sponsored an
amendment to a federal spending bill to prevent San Francisco from
spending any part of $260 million in federal housing money to implement
the Ordinance. 2 The denied funds included rent subsidies for low-income
families.53 Riggs said:
I just thought, "My goodness, has political correctness gotten to
the point where we're going to deny services to the homeless and
to AIDS patients?" Somebody ought to stand up and say they
think this is wrong, and you're not going to use federal funding to
accomplish this purpose.
While "virtually no one" in the House rose to defend the legislation
closely with... various Hawaii legislators in order to ensure that an amendment protecting
the family would be approved." ACLJ, Center Makes Bold Move: Newest Office Faces
Heavy LegalAction (visited Oct. 19, 1998) <http://www.aclj.org/CN0797.html>.
47. Id.
48. See S.D. Myers, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8748, at *41. The court rejected, among
other arguments, the plaintiff's contention that the Ordinance contradicted state marriage
laws. See id. at *12.
49. See AssocLATED PRESS, Under a Proposal Planned by Rep. Frank Riggs, A.P. POL.
SERVICE, July 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7430445.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Correction, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1998, at A2.
53. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 49.
54. Id.; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Gay Policy in San Francisco Draws Penalty in
the House, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1998, at A18 (stating that according to Mr. Riggs, the San
Francisco Ordinance was motivated by a "morally objectionable policy" that "wrongly
elevated unmarried homosexuals to the same status as married heterosexuals").
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besides Mr. Riggs, the House passed it by a vote of 214 to 212 on July 29,
1998. 55  Opponents of the legislation were "aghast. 56  Representative
Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.) called the amendment "mean-spirited, bigoted,
bigoted"; Representative Tom Lantos (D-Cal.) said the amendment was "a
poorly disguised assault on a persecuted minority";5 7 and San Francisco
Supervisor Leslie Katz responded, "San Francisco has done something so
monumental that extremists are going to extremes to dismantle it."5' While
the Senate did not take action on the amendment before the 105th Congress
expired, this amendment illustrates the national impact of the Ordinance
and highlights the fact that it comes at a time of increased intensity in the
national debate over lesbian and gay rights.59
D. The Opponents' Basic Policy Arguments6°
At the heart of their claims, the ATA and United object to a local
government interfering with employment policies. United maintains that
the case is "about whether or not a local government can dictate the
employee policies of a company engaged in interstate commerce.... The
airlines can't be subjected to the whims of local politicians. '61 The ATA
adds that it has "nothing against the concept of domestic partners benefits
per se, 'but what we're trying to do is keep it in a proper forum.... What
we're fighting for is the ability of airlines to handle this issue between
management and... employees."' 62  Others echo the ATA/United
objection to government intervention in the employer-employee
relationship. For instance, "Will Perkins, chairman of the group Colorado
55. See Seelye, supra note 54, at A18. The amendment was supported by 189




58. ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 49.
59. See, e.g., id. (noting that conservatives in 1998 coordinated a national campaign
against homosexuals in an effort to increase conservative voter tum-out); Carolyn
Lochhead, GOP Takes Aim at S.F.'s Partners Law, S.F. CHRON., July 18, 1998, at Al
(calling the amendment "another GOP strike at the gay movement" and noting that Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) recently compared homosexuals to alcoholics and
kleptomaniacs and refused to schedule a vote on the nomination of gay businessman James
Hormel as ambassador to Luxembourg).
60. For analysis of the policy arguments in favor of domestic partnership benefits, see
Home, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that extending domestic partner benefits promotes "the
social, emotional, and economic stability of the partners individually and of the families
created by the partners. The larger society will benefit from these improvements in many
ways. For example, partners in stable relationships will be more productive, more involved
in their community, and less likely to be dependent on social programs.").
61. Lewis, supra note 41, at Al (quoting United spokesperson Sue Thurman).
62. Gordon, supra note 39, at A15 (quoting ATA spokesperson David Fuscus).
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for Family Values, opposes the extension of health benefits to same-sex
partners of employees.... [H]is real objection is to being 'forced by the
government' to institute domestic-partner benefits."
63
Some opponents of the Ordinance proffer moral arguments against
legitimizing homosexual relationships. Such rhetoric was a particularly
strong factor in the suit brought by the ACLJ, as well as the Riggs
amendment. The ACLJ calls the Ordinance a threat "to our religious
liberties and freedoms." 64 The group's challenge was based on a claim that
domestic partnership benefits undermine traditional marriage. The group's
Western Regional Counsel, Benn Bull, describes the Ordinance as "a
dagger aimed at the heart of traditional marriage." 65 The ACLJ's claim that
the Ordinance undermines traditional marriage is nothing new. Lesbian
and gay rights supporters for years have fought the argument that the
official recognition of homosexual relationships would somehow detract
from heterosexual ones. The Ordinance was in fact passed in large part as
a remedy to the sort of homophobia that the ACLJ promotes.
On the other hand, United has always said that it is not fighting the
66Ordinance because it objects to lesbian and gay rights. United claims that
it has "zero-tolerance" for "harassment and discrimination in any form-
whether verbal, visual, physical or otherwise. It is United's express policy
to forbid harassment and discrimination based on race, color, sex, age,
religion, national origin, disability, veteran status or sexual orientation." 67
The airline further states that it "maintains a strong commitment to
diversity" and adds that given the diversity of its clientele, "we value
diversity not only because it's the right thing to do, but because it's the
right business thing to do.' 68 In its defense, the airline also points out that
it donates money to lesbian and gay organizations and offers bereavement
benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of employees. 69 And in support
of its claim that it is motivated by factors other than having to give
domestic partnership benefits, United has continued with the suit even after
making a permanent policy change in favor of offering the benefits.
63. Leib, supra note 6, at Bus. 1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. For example, United Chairman and CEO James Goodwin claims that the lawsuit
"has never been about gay and lesbian rights." Rising to the Occasion, ADvoc., Aug. 3 1,
1999, at 12.
67. United Airlines, Employment Policies (visited Oct. 21, 1998)
<http:/www.ual.comlairline/0ur-company/policies.asp> (emphasis added). United Airlines
is not the first corporation that claimed not to discriminate and then became involved in
domestic partnership litigation. See, e.g., Hargrove, supra note 1, at 51 (describing Rovira
v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), in which the surviving partner of a
deceased AT&T sales manager brought suit seeking "sickness-death benefit").
68. United Airlines, supra note 67.
69. See Lewis, supra note 41, at Al.
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Whether United admits it, however, it did choose a side in the moral
debate by fighting so hard against a groundbreaking domestic partnership
law. According to David Tomb, founder of the gay and lesbian employees
organization called "United at United," United is "really missing the mark
on gay and lesbian issues.... I think there is still a level of homophobia. It
disappoints me to think that, but that is what comes to mind."70  San
Francisco Supervisor Leslie Katz called United's argument "disingenuous"
and found that it "rings hollow.",7' Before the court forced United to offer
some benefits, Katz added that if United were truly committed to fairness,
it would "go ahead and do it, provide the benefits. They could have done it
before the ordinance was enacted. 72
Financial cost may have been another factor in United's fight against
the Ordinance. As San Francisco Chief Assistant City Attorney Dennis
Aftergut points out, "[f]or 20 years, the airlines did not make a peep about
being subjected to our nondiscrimination law. Only when we included
equal benefits did United start claiming that it can't be subjected to local
laws. 73  However, if cost is a factor for United, its reasoning is
questionable. As discussed in Part I, extending domestic partnership
benefits to same-sex couples usually costs relatively little. Furthermore,
leading gay rights organizations called for a boycott of the airline,74 and the
airline's lawsuit has received substantial publicity. United antagonized
homosexual consumers at its own peril, given that statistically gays and
lesbians tend to be more loyal consumers than heterosexuals; 75 lesbians and
gays also tend to have greater disposable income and travel more than
heterosexuals.76
70. Schodolski, supra note 5, at Bus. 1.
71. Lewis, supra note 41, at Al.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Jason B. Johnson, Gay Rights Groups Support Boycott Against United, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 15, 1998, at A25. See also United Against United (visited Sep. 21, 1998)
<http://www.equalbenefits.org>. Note that, claiming victory, United Against United called
off the boycott after United began offering benefits. See id.
75. See Abby R. Spiro, A Forgotten Market?, TRAvEL AGENT, Sept. 28, 1998, at 143
(quoting travel professional Vicki Skinner saying, "No one is more loyal than a gay client,
but no one will destroy you more than a gay client").
76. See id.
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IV. RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF THE ORDINANCE: THE DISTRICT COURT
DECISION
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
In Air Transport J,77 the decision of the California District Court in the
lawsuit filed by the ATA on behalf of United and other airlines operating in
San Francisco, the court limited the scope of the Ordinance on grounds of
conflict with the Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause.78 The court
declared:
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution...
empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States." The Supreme Court has
interpreted the clause not only to grant legislative power to
Congress but also impliedly to limit the power of State and local
governments to enact laws affecting foreign and interstate
commerce. The implied limitation on State and local powers is
referred to as the dormant Commerce Clause.79
When a state statute is found to directly regulate interstate commerce,
courts generally strike it down "without further inquiry. '80 The court added
that "[t]he principles guiding this assessment... reflect the Constitution's
special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union
unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with
the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.""
The court concluded that the Ordinance violated the limitations on
extraterritorial regulation imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause.
s 2
Once a company signs a contract with the City (or seeks to make a contract
with the City), it must offer domestic partnership benefits to all of its
employees in the United States or face the penalties imposed by the City.83
The court determined that these penalties "effectively regulate[]"
extraterritorial activities and added that "[u]nless shielded by the market
participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.... the Ordinance
is unconstitutional as applied to out-of-State conduct."
4
77. See Air Trans. Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1161
(N.D. Cal. 1998).
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
79. Air Transport 1, 992 F. Supp. at 1161 (citations omitted).
80. Id. (citiig Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
81. Id. at 1161-62 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335 (1989)).




The court also found that the marketplace exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause does not shield the Ordinance. 5 The marketplace
exception allows a State, in the absence of congressional action, to
participate in the market and exercise "the right to favor its own citizens
over others. 8 6 The Supreme Court has defined the limits of the exception:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows
a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in
which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further. The State
may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or
contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that
particular market.8 7
The district court maintained that by "purchasing services or leasing
property," the City clearly acted as a market participant when it
implemented the Ordinance. 8 Therefore, "[t]he only question before the
Court... is whether, by implementing the Ordinance, the City
inappropriately reaches beyond the sphere of economic activity in which it
is participating in an attempt to regulate commerce beyond its borders." 9
The court decided that the City had reached beyond these borders when it
sought to regulate the benefits of out-of-state employees through the threat
of penalties. 90 These out-of-state employees can "hardly be described, even
informally, as 'working for the city."' 9' The court consequently struck
"down the Ordinance insofar as it applies to the out-of-state conduct."92
However, the court found that the Ordinance as applied to conduct
93within the state does not place undue burdens on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has ruled that a State may "burden interstate
transactions... incidentally" but may not "affirmatively discriminate
against such transactions." 94 The court determined that it would uphold the
Ordinance if it sought "even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce [were] only
incidental. 95  Alternatively, the court said that it would strike down a
measure that imposed a burden on interstate commerce that was "clearly
85. See id. at 1163.
86. Id. at 1162 (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)).





91. Id. (citing White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204,211 n.7 (1983)).
92. Id. at 1164.
93. See id.
94. Id. (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986)).
95. Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 96
The court did find that the City had enacted the Ordinance in an effort
to promote a legitimate public policy interest-that of discouraging
"discriminatory business practices." 97 The court analogized the Ordinance
to two cases in which courts had found legitimate public policy interests in
the choices of local governments to fight discrimination by refusing to
employ companies that promoted racial discrimination and apartheid.9s
Likewise, San Francisco's previous efforts to fight discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation have been upheld.99 "[T]hus, the Ordinance
effectuates a legitimate local public interest, to combat discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. ' °
Since the City's interests are legitimate, the Ordinance fails "only if
the burdens it places on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits."10' 1 The court found that any burden
on interstate commerce did not outweigh the public interest served by the
Ordinance. 02 Those who had been discriminated against by a denial of
domestic partnership benefits were "victims," while the burden of
modifying discriminatory benefit plans was "minor," especially given the
fact that employers can comply with the Ordinance without an increase in
their benefits costs by reducing or eliminating benefits for spouses of
heterosexual employees.0 3 In short, insofar as the Ordinance does not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition of extraterritorial
regulation, it does not place an excessive burden on interstate commerce.
B. ERISA
The court also found that the Ordinance was substantially preempted
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").' °4 "ERISA
96. Id. at 1165.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1164 (discussing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,492
(1989); Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989)).
99. San Francisco has a long history of taking a principled stand against discrimination
and of being in the forefront of efforts to ban discrimination based on sexual orientation.
See, e.g., Alioto's Fish Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 174 Cal. Rptr. 763, 766 n.4 (Ct. App.
1981) (noting that since 1972, the City has prohibited contractors from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation).
100. Air Transport 1, 992 F. Supp. at 1164.
101. Id. at 1165.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). This case is not the first time that ERISA
preemption has limited the scope of gay rights legislation. In Seattle, the Human Rights
Department determined that denial of coverage to domestic partners by private employers
"might violate city laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status." Home,
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contains an express preemption clause providing that the law 'shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan' as described in the act."' ' The rationale of
the ERISA preemption clause is to:
create a unified federal law so as to avoid subjecting multi-state
employers to inconsistent court rulings. Thus, state and local law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and/or marital status is useless in challenging a benefits denial.
While ERISA prohibits discrimination in eligibility
determinations to the same extent as federal law generally, sexual
orientation and marital status are not now included among federal
statutes making discrimination unlawful.
106
The court acknowledged that the scope of ERISA preemption has
been in a state of flux in recent years.'07 In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,0s
the Supreme Court broadly construed ERISA's "relate to" preemption
provision.' 9 Invalidating a New York law that required employers to pay
pregnant employees benefits, the Court stated that a "law 'relates to' an
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan."" However, in a subsequent
decision the Supreme Court observed that "there must be some limit to
ERISA preemption, but.., neither the language of the provision nor the
Court's prior decisions interpreting that language provided much guidance
as to where to draw the line.""' Rather than looking to the "unhelpful text
supra note 3, at 50. As a result of the potential ERISA conflict, the holding was
"subsequently limited to municipal employees." Id.
105. Air Transport 1, 992 F. Supp. at 1166 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998)).
106. Lee F. Bantle, Employment Benefits for Non-Traditional Family Members:
Challenging the Employer's Denial, in LEGAL IssUES FACING THE NON-TRADMONAL
FAMY 1994 at 183, 185-86, (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No.
D4-5250, 1994) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)); see also Arthur
S. Leonard, Lesbian and Gay Families and the Law: A Progress Report, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 927, 952 (1994) ("ERISA preempts state and local governments from attempting to
regulate employee benefits, thus precluding them from either directly requiring private
employers to recognize employee domestic partners or indirectly requiring such recognition
through the enforcement of general antidiscrimination statutes.") (citations omitted).
107. For opposing views of ERISA preemption law as it relates to the Ordinance, see
Jeffrey A. Brauch, Municipal Activism v. Federal Law: Why ERISA Preempts San
Francisco-Style Domestic Partner Ordinances, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 925 (1998), and
Catherine L. Fisk, Queer Matters: Emerging Issues in Sexual Orientation Law: ERISA
Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership and Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (1998).
108. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
109. See id. at 98.
110. Id. at 96-97.
111. Air Trans. Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1166 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (discussing New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)).
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and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, [courts must] look
instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the
state law that Congress understood would survive."'
112
After looking to Congress' intent in passing ERISA and applying the
"connection to" test, the Air Transport I court determined that large
portions of the Ordinance were preempted by ERISA. 13 In addition, the
court indicated that though the City was motivated by a "laudable" goal of
combating discrimination," 4 the Ordinance requires "City contractors to
modify employee benefit plans that discriminate between employees with
spouses and employees with domestic partners. This ... directly interferes
with ERISA's goal of shielding employee benefit plans from inconsistent
State and local regulation."'
15
The court also found that the Ordinance's provisions for non-ERISA
benefits were not preempted because there was no substantial connection
between these benefits and ERISA.116 The court stated that "[t]o the extent
the Ordinance is applied to benefits that... require no 'ongoing
administrative program,' the Ordinance does not apply to a 'plan' and thus
is not preempted."'17 The court also noted, however, that many benefits
covered by the Ordinance "require procedures for determining the
eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disbursements,
monitoring the availability of funds for benefit payments, and keeping
appropriate records," and thus amount to a plan and are subject to
preemption.'
In short, non-ERISA benefits "such as moving expenses, memberships
and membership discounts and travel benefits, are not governed by ERISA
at all," and thus are not preempted.'19 Also, ERISA-covered benefits that
are not offered through an ERISA plan, such as family medical and
bereavement leave, are not preempted. 120 However, benefits that are
covered by ERISA and are offered through an ERISA plan are
preempted-including health insurance, pension benefits, and family
112. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 656.
113. 992 F. Supp. at 1176.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 1169.
117. Id. The court added that non-ERISA benefits are not preempted even if they are
administered through an ERISA plan. See id. at 1174; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987).
118. Air Transport 1, 992 F. Supp. at 1169 (citations omitted). The San Francisco
Human Rights Commission's regulations implementing the Ordinance define "benefits as
any plan, program or policy provided by a City Contractor to its employees as part of the
employer's total compensation package." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 1175.
120. See id. at 1180.
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medical and bereavement leave.
121
The City argued that the Ordinance did "not 'mandate employee
benefit structures' because employers can purchase separate insurance
coverage for their employees' domestic partners ('stand-alone plans'),
which would not be ERISA plans."'22 The court rejected this argument for
two reasons. First, the court was not persuaded by the City's claim that "if
employers purchase separate health insurance policies for their employees'
domestic partners, those policies would not be part of an ERISA plan''2
because the domestic partners would not fit the ERISA definitions of a plan
"participant" or "participants' beneficiaries. '2 a The court found that this
reading of the statute was "unnatural" and that the City's interpretation was
contrary to the purposes of the statute. l'z Second, the court determined that
even if a stand-alone plan were not an ERISA plan, ERISA still would
preempt it because a stand-alone plan is classified by comparison to an
ERISA plan.1
26
Finally, concerning the dormant Commerce Clause, the City
maintained that because of a marketplace participant exception ERISA
should not preempt the Ordinance. 27 Citing the recent narrowing of the
scope of ERISA preemption, the court recognized the possibility of a
128narrow marketplace participant exception. However, this exemption
only applies when a state is acting as a proprietor, not as a regulator.129
When a state imposes conditions on contracts to ensure a high quality work
product, it is acting as a proprietor. 30 Though the City said that its primary
motivation in passing the Ordinance was to attract the highest quality
workforce possible,'3' the court disagreed, holding that the City had acted
in an effort to regulate employers' employee benefit practices.132 When a
state acts to induce a contractor to stop discriminating in the provision of
121. See id.
122. Id. at 1169.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1170-71
125. See id. at 1171.
126. See id. at 1172-73.
127. See id. at 1178.
128. See id. The Ninth Circuit had twice held that there is no marketplace participant
exception to ERISA preemption. See id. However, the Air Transport I court did not feel
bound by these precedents because of the Supreme Court's narrowing of the ERISA
preemption clause in subsequent decisions. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1179.
132. See id. "The connection between eliminating domestic partner discrimination in
employee benefit plans and the quality of services provided by the contractor is too tenuous
and remote to explain the City's enactment of the ordinance. In any case, this rationale
would only exempt the ordinance to the extent it is applied to work performed directly for
the City." Id.
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employee benefits, it is acting as a regulator. 33 "This goal... no matter
how well-intentioned or just, conflicts with Congress' intent that ERISA
permit uniform national employee benefit plan administration.'
13 4
In recognizing the existence of a narrow marketplace participation
exception, the court noted that in passing ERISA, Congress did not intend
to prohibit states from using contracts to make statements of political
expression to the extent that these actions do not have "practical economic
impact on the employer that is either different from that of the ordinary
consumer or is otherwise governmental in nature., 135 The court concluded
that ERISA would not preempt regulations in instances "where the City
wields no more power than an ordinary consumer in its contracting
relationships.' 36  Therefore, this exception does not apply to the Air
Transport I case as the City clearly wields more power than an ordinary
consumer due to its monopoly in the leasing of airport space.
37
C. The Airline Deregulation Act
The court, for the most part, rejected an argument that the Airline
Deregulation Act ("ADA") preempted the Ordinance. 38  "The ADA
provides that State and local authorities 'may not enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service' of an airline." 139 However, the court went on to
state, "Exempted from this preemption provision, however, are State or
local governments that own or operate airports when they are 'carrying out
[their] proprietary powers and rights.'
' 140
The court employed a similar analysis to determine whether a
provision "relates to" the ADA as it used with ERISA-a substantial
connection test.14' The court determined that the Ordinance did not relate
to price or services closely enough to warrant preemption.' 42 The court
noted, however, that while the Ordinance does not specifically refer to




135. Id. at 1179-80 (quoting Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 95 F.3d
1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a city's boycott of a newspaper in advertising and
subscriptions as a protest of that newspaper's labor practices)).
136. Id. at 1180.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1181-88.
139. Id. at 1181 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994)).
140. Id. at 1181 (citation omitted).
141. See id. at 1182-88.
142. See id. at 1183-87.
143. See id. at 1187.
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would occur... only if the City applies the Ordinance to leases
or other contracts that are essential to a carrier's operations at the
Airport.... By raising barriers to a carrier's use of a particular
airport, the Ordinance would interfere with the potential for full
market competition between carriers on as many routes as
possible. To the extent the Ordinance has this effect, therefore, it
is preempted by the ADA. 44
The court added that such interference would exist only when the
burden of complying with the Ordinance was so great as to coerce airlines
into changing their routes.145 The court later ruled that the Plaintiffs'
argument fell "far short" of proving that carriers would alter their routes
due to the Ordinance.
146
D. The Railway Labor Act
In determining that the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), the federal law
governing labor relations in the airline industry, did not preempt the
Ordinance, the court rejected several arguments made by Plaintiffs. 47
First, the Plaintiffs claimed that the RLA preempts the Ordinance because
enforcing the Ordinance would require interpreting the air carriers'
collective bargaining agreements. 4  The RLA preempts state causes of
action to enforce collective bargaining agreements but not actions to
enforce rights independent of collective bargaining agreements.149 Though
a court may consult a collective bargaining agreement to determine
whether spouses and domestic partners are receiving equal benefits, the
source of the right to equal benefits is independent of the collective
bargaining agreement.' 50 Therefore, the RLA does not preempt the
Ordinance on that basis.' 5'
Second, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that "the Ordinance is
preempted because it imposes obligations that are inconsistent with the
terms of the air carriers' collective bargaining agreements.' 52 The court
indicated that accepting this argument would permit employers and
employees to agree to "exempt themselves from State law."' 53
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See Air Trans. Ass'n of America v. City & County of San Francisco, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8747, No. C97-07163CW, at *26-27 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1999).
147. See Air Transport 1, 992 F. Supp. at 1189-90.
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Third, the court found that the Ordinance did not alter the balance
between employers and unions in collective bargaining.154  "States
generally may not take actions that alter the balance of power between
labor and management in areas deliberately left unregulated by
Congress.' ' 5 5 However, the "effect of the Ordinance is to bar the City from
contracting with employers who discriminate, 15 6 regardless of whether the
employees are unionized. The Ordinance was not enacted in an "attempt to
alter the balance of power between labor and management in the federally-
governed collective bargaining process., 157  Rather, the Ordinance was
intended to provide "specific minimum protections to individual workers,"
a permissible goal under the RLA.' 58
Finally, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Ordinance
dictates how unions and employers must negotiate collective bargaining
agreements, or alternatively, that the Ordinance requires employers to make
unilateral changes in employment contracts, thereby violating federal labor
law. 159  If employers do not wish to unilaterally provide the benefits,
regulations permit contractors a temporary waiver from the Ordinance
while they negotiate with employees.' 6°  "Because the City cannot
authorize conduct that is prohibited by federal labor law, the Court
interprets the HRC regulations to condition a temporary waiver on
unilateral action by a union employer only when that unilateral action is not
arguably prohibited by federal labor law.
161
154. See id. at 1189-90.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1190.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755
(1985)).
159. See id. "In most circumstances, federal labor law prohibits employers from making
unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment, even if the changes are
favorable to the employees." Id. at 1191 (citations omitted).
160. See id. at 1190. The Ordinance's regulations temporarily suspend the Ordinance's
nondiscrimination requirements for city contractors with collective bargaining agreements
under certain conditions.
Such contractors are not deemed to be discriminating in the provision of
benefits 1) if a collective bargaining agreement governing the provision of
benefits is in effect at the time of the first award of a city contract to the
contractor following the effective date of the Ordinance, 2) if the contractor
takes all reasonable measures to end any discrimination in benefit programs, by
taking unilateral action or by asking the unions to reopen the union contract to
negotiate a nondiscriminatory benefits package, and 3) if the contractor
provides a cash equivalent to eligible employees in the event the contractor's
reasonable efforts to eliminate the discrimination are unsuccessful.
Id. (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 1191.
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E. Summary of the Court's Decision
The court's decision has a substantial limiting effect on the Ordinance.
The court invalidated the Ordinance's requirement that employees based
outside of San Francisco must receive equal domestic partnership benefits.
Additionally, federal law preempts the Ordinance insofar as it applies to
ERISA benefits that are administered through ERISA plans. The ADA,
however, will not preempt the Ordinance, unless the burden of complying
with the otherwise valid portions of the Ordinance is so onerous that air
carriers practically would be forced to stop using the San Francisco
Airport. Finally, the Ordinance is not preempted by the RLA. Thus, the
main benefit left intact by the court's decision is that non-ERISA benefits
may not be discriminatorily provided to workers based in San Francisco. 62
V. Is THE SAN FRANCISCO APPROACH TO SECURING DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIP BENEFITS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PAST APPROACHES?
A. Court-Based Approaches to Obtaining Domestic Partnership Benefits
Plaintiffs seeking domestic partnership benefits might invoke a city's
or state's nondiscrimination ordinance to argue that the denial of domestic
partnership benefits is illegal and violates these laws. These arguments,
however, have not been successful in the past, as state courts have
generally "deferred to state legislatures [in matters of employee
compensation] and directed non-married employees claiming
discrimination and unjust compensation to petition for statutory reform."' 63
Plaintiffs might also argue that withholding domestic partnership
benefits from homosexual couples is a violation of the equal protection
clauses included in both the federal and state constitutions. While no
Supreme Court case discusses the subject of same-sex domestic partnership
benefits, lower courts have generally not used an equal protection analysis
to mandate nondiscrimination in employment-linked benefits. In many
cases that go to trial, the same-sex couple asserts that this denial of benefits
162. Both sides claimed victory following the court's decision. City Attorney Louise
Renne said, "This is a very historic decision.... This is the first major decision upholding a
domestic partners ordinance." Edward Epstein, Judge's Ruling Affirms Domestic Partner
Law in S.F., S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 1998, at Al1. San Francisco Supervisor Tom Anmiano
said, "I am happy as a pig in a poke. The law was left standing." 1d. But Plaintiffs'
attorney Brendan Dolan of the law firm of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison said, "[w]e view
this as a complete victory for what we set out to do." Id. ATA spokesperson David Fuscus
said, "[tihe ruling represents an embarrassing day" for San Francisco. Id.
163. Kate Latimer, Domestic Partners and Discrimination: The Need for Fair
Employment Compensation, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 329, 332 (1991).
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is discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status. To
date, courts have been disinclined to agree with these arguments.164 Thus,
at present, the Ordinance is a more effective strategy for obtaining benefits
than an equal protection approach.
A few courts have begun to invalidate other discriminatory measures
on the grounds of equal protection clause violations. The Supreme Court in
Romer v. Evans 16 required at least a rational basis for a classification on
the basis of sexual orientation.66 This holding suggests that sexual
orientation may eventually be elevated to a higher level of scrutiny by the
Supreme Court.
Reliance on a state constitution's equal protection clause was crucial
to the holding in Baehr v. Lewin'67 recognizing gay marriages. 161 In that
case, the court held that the Hawaii constitution's equal protection clause is
not a "mirror image" of the Fourteenth Amendment and requires a strict
level of scrutiny for statutes dealing with sexual orientation. 169 Though
constitutional arguments have thus far been generally unsuccessful in the
domestic partnership benefits context, they are beginning to win success in
other areas of lesbian and gay rights; when they are successful their impact
can be tremendous. 7°
B. State and Local Legislative Approaches
One author has described the different methods by which a state
legislature may provide domestic partnership benefits as "carrot" or "stick"
approaches.1 71  "A 'carrot' approach works by encouraging the private
sector to change its policy in order to receive a reward." 172 An example of
such a policy is a tax incentive for employers that provide benefits to
domestic partners. 173 In contrast,
164. See id. at 333. For relevant cases, see generally, Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp.
1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 572 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Ct. App. 1985).
165. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
166. See id. at 631-32.
167. 852P.2d44 (Haw. 1993).
168. See id. at 66.
169. See id. at 59-68.
170. In recent years, courts have ranged from very gay-friendly as in Baehr at 44, to very
homophobic as in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The court in Air Transport I
was actually rather gay-friendly, calling the San Francisco Ordinance's policy goals
"laudable." Air Transp. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1176 (N.D. Cal.
1998). Other cities and states taking legislative action may face judges who are less
receptive to arguments in support of lesbian and gay rights.




"Stick" policies are designed to encourage the private sector to
change its policy to avoid a punishment. "Stick" policies are
probably less desirable than "carrot" policies in today's political
climate for two reasons: (1) they will likely be viewed more
negatively by voters and industry, and (2) they may create a
conflict between [sic] the three levels of government
regulations.' 74
The San Francisco Ordinance may be viewed as a "stick" approach
because it penalizes companies that do not extend domestic partnership
benefits by denying them the opportunity to do business with the City.
Alternatively, the San Francisco Ordinance may be viewed as a "carrot"
approach because it rewards companies by granting them an advantage in
securing potential contracts if they provide domestic partnership benefits.
The notion that the City is using a "stick" approach has resulted in a
negative reception by some companies and rulings by some courts that the
Ordinance is in conflict with federal laws.
The recent battle over legalization of same-sex marriage in Hawaii
reveals other crucial state legislative issues. A constitutional amendment
outlawing gay marriage passed the Hawaii legislature175 and was ratified by
state voters in 1998.176 In spite of this setback, Hawaii has passed
legislation recognizing domestic partnership on a state level. 77 The Hawaii
experience thus shows the potential for both great successes and setbacks at
a state legislative level. Due to its broader application, a comprehensive
state law is usually preferable to a local law. Where a legislature is
unwilling to pass a state law, however, a local law may be a more realistic
alternative. Both state and local laws face the problem of federal
preemption.
C. A Federal Legislative Approach
Working to change federal laws is potentially an effective means of
winning domestic partnership benefits. An amendment to ERISA requiring
equality in domestic partnership benefits would be ideal. Congress is
unlikely to pass such an amendment at present, however, as the federal
government has consistently extended benefits to married couples while
denying them to domestic partners; these benefits include "preferential tax
treatment, federal employee benefits, military personnel benefits, social
174. Id. at 49-50.
175. See ACLJ, supra note 46.
176. See Carey Goldberg, Vermont Supreme Court Takes Up Marriage, N.Y. Taims,
Nov. 19, 1998, at A20.
177. See Boxall, supra note 12.
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security benefits, spousal citizenship, and entitlement benefits., 178  The
federal government denies these benefits to domestic partners because it
"usually does not recognize any partnerships absent marriage" and "many
federal benefits, including income tax and social security benefits, rely on
state definitions of 'spouse' to determine the eligibility of a partner.'
179
The recently passed so-called Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") is
a further step backwards. In DOMA, Congress defines marriage as a
relationship between "one man and one woman"'80 and denies federal
benefits to same-sex spouses even if their marriage is recognized by a
state. '' The fact that DOMA was passed by a very large margin does not
bode well for future efforts to extend federal recognition to gay and lesbian
relationships. Finally, the Riggs amendment'12 is evidence of congressional
hostility toward efforts to extend domestic partnership benefits.
In spite of general federal refusal to recognize gay and lesbian
relationships, Congress has come close to enacting a measure that would
greatly strengthen gay and lesbian employment rights. The Employment
Nondiscrimination Act ("ENDA") "would amend Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act by adding sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for
discrimination to the current categories of race, religion, gender, and
national origin." ' 3 A similar bill fell one vote shy of passage in the Senate
in 1996."4 Passage of ENDA, however, would not override ERISA's
preemption of the San Francisco Ordinance because ENDA specifically
provides, "[tlhis Act does not apply to the provision of employee benefits
to an individual for the benefit of his or her partner.
' 185
D. Company by Company Approach
Employees who work for companies that do not provide domestic
partnership benefits may find that the most immediate way to secure
benefits is to approach management of their company directly.116 Gay and
lesbian employees may approach employers individually, form an
organization for gay and lesbian employees, or convince their unions to
178. Home, supra note 3, at 41.
179. Id.
180. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. II 1996) (defining marriage and spouse).
181. See Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in
the Wake ofRomer v. Evans, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 263,299 (1997).
182. See discussion supra Part III.
183. Nadya Aswad, Employment Discrimination: Federal Gay Rights Legislation Is
Reintroduced in House, Senate, 66 U.S.L.W. 2009, 2009 (1997).
184. See id.; see also Winnie Stachelberg, Position of Strength: ENDA Reintroduced
with More Cosponsors, Momentum, HUM. RTs. CAMPAIGN Q., Summer 1997, at 12, 12.
185. Leonard, supra note 106, at951 n.116.
186. See Hargrove, supra note 1, at 52-53, for an account of how to get an employer to
offer domestic partnership benefits.
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seek domestic partnership benefits through the collective bargaining
process. The fact that many corporations have extended domestic
partnership benefits in recent years'87 demonstrates that approaching
management may be an effective means of securing benefits. This
approach, however, is not a comprehensive solution to the problem, and
many companies are likely to refuse to give the benefits unless they are
compelled to do so by law. Ordinances based on the San Francisco model
are an effective way of spurring reluctant companies to offer at least some
domestic partnership benefits.
VI. CONCLUSION
A comparison of the San Francisco Ordinance with other approaches
reveals that, even as originally drafted, the Ordinance is clearly not a
comprehensive means of securing domestic partnership benefits for all
employees. The Ordinance targets only those companies that seek to enter
into contracts with local government. In addition, employers have the
option of complying with the measure by denying benefits to married
couples, rather than by offering them to domestic partners. Finally, the
Ordinance does not require that the benefits be consistent from employer to
employer.
After the decision in Air Transport I, the effectiveness of the
Ordinance is further compromised-the Ordinance applies only to local
employees and only includes non-ERISA benefits.18 1 Important categories
of benefits such as health insurance and pensions are now usually beyond
the reach of ordinances patterned after San Francisco's. Equally
disappointing is the fact that the Ordinance will no longer compel the
extension of benefits to workers who live outside of San Francisco.
Clearly, only national legislation or recognition by the Supreme Court that
classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to strict
scrutiny will lead to full equality in domestic partnership benefits for all
U.S. workers.
While ordinances similar to San Francisco's are by no means
comprehensive solutions, they remain an effective strategy for winning
benefits. First, lawmakers who support such ordinances can immediately
secure non-ERISA benefits for some workers in their cities without waiting
for action by courts or legislatures!8 9 Further, many employers may
decide, as United did, to offer ERISA benefits after being compelled to
187. See Boxall, supra note 12.
188. See discussion supra Part IV.
189. Already, "[o]fficials in other cities, such as Portland, Seattle, New York and San
Diego, have expressed interest in adopting their own versions of the law." Gordon, supra
note 39, at A15.
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offer non-ERISA ones. And though the Ordinance no longer compels
employers to offer benefits to workers outside of San Francisco, some
predict that employers will find it difficult to offer benefits to workers in
San Francisco but not to workers in other parts of the country. 190
Early signs, even following limitation of the Ordinance by the Air
Transport I & II decisions, are encouraging. Unlike United, hundreds of
companies have quietly complied with the Ordinance: in 1998, for
example, 882 of the 964 employers nationwide that began offering
domestic partnership benefits did so as a result of the Ordinance. 91 Also
encouraging is evidence of a "domino effect" within industries once one
major company begins to offer benefits. For example, U.S. Airways and
American Airlines also began to offer domestic partnership benefits within
days of United's decision.
192
The United Airlines experience and the high number of employers
now offering domestic partnership benefits as a result of the Ordinance
show that other city ordinances modeled on San Francisco's could indeed
be a highly effective, realistic strategy for securing domestic partnership
benefits for many workers. Other cities contemplating passing similar
ordinances may want to consider a scaled down, non-ERISA version of San
Francisco's law to discourage court challenges. Even non-ERISA benefits
laws can immediately secure important benefits for workers, and, more
importantly, lead to broader domestic partnership benefits by changing
employer attitudes and industry climates.
190. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 162, at Al1. Indeed, United intends to offer domestic
partnership benefits to all of its employees worldwide. See United Airlines Press Release,
United Airlines Becomes First U.S. Airline to Offer Partner Benefits Package to Employees,
Retirees Worldwide <http://www.ual.com/admin/Press View_Detail.asp?rec-nbr=538>
(visited Sep. 18, 1999).
191. See KiM I. MILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE STATE OF THE
WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISExUAL AND TRANSGENDERED AMERICANS, 5 (1999).
1,228 of the 1,281 employers that added domestic partnership benefits in 1997 did so as a
result of the Ordinance. See id.
192. See Three Major U.S. Airlines to Offer Same-Sex Benefits, 14 AIRLINE FINANCIAL
NEws, Aug. 16, 1999, at 32; see also Deb Price, Domestic Partner Benefits Become Norm,
DETROIT NEWs, Aug. 16, 1999, at A9.
